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POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO DNA 
TESTING: WHY MASSACHUSETTS’S 278A 
STATUTE SHOULD BE THE MODEL  
FOR THE FUTURE 
THEODORE TIBBITTS* 
Abstract: With the recent rise of the Innocence Movement, many traditional po-
lice tools for evaluating forensic evidence have been called into question. In-
creasingly, science has proven that certain outdated forensic analyses are unrelia-
ble or invalid, shedding light on how these faulty analyses have contributed to 
numerous unjust convictions of innocent people. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
technology, a subset of forensic analysis, has performed the counterpoint to this 
trend by exonerating many wrongfully convicted individuals. Access to DNA 
testing, however, is inconsistent from state to state. Massachusetts’s new 278A 
motion is a strong model for the correct implementation of a statute providing 
post-conviction access to DNA testing. States such as Pennsylvania, which has a 
plethora of barriers to post-conviction relief through DNA testing, should look to 
Massachusetts’s 278A statute as an example on which to base updated post-
conviction statutes in order to provide the necessary justice to those who have 
been wrongfully convicted. 
INTRODUCTION 
In midsummer 1977, the police of Homewood, Illinois encountered a dis-
mal scene.1 A young woman with clothes and hair in a state of disarray was 
walking by the side of the road, claiming to have been raped.2 She was rushed to 
a hospital, where doctors combed her pubic hair and swabbed her vaginal area 
for samples.3 Her underwear was packaged and saved as possible evidence.4 The 
young woman was also asked to help with the formation of a composite drawing 
of her attacker and identify his photo from a collection of mug shots.5 She chose 
the mug shot of Gary Dotson.6 On this evidence, Gary Dotson was charged and 
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 6 See id. She would later identify him in a line-up as well. Id. 
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brought to trial, and was ultimately sentenced to twenty-five to fifty years in 
prison.7 
Aside from the alleged victim, the only witness that the State of Illinois 
brought against Dotson at trial was a forensic analyst.8 Unfortunately for Dotson, 
the analyst’s testimony was rife with inaccuracies and easily misinterpreted 
statements.9 For instance, he stated that he had found several pubic hairs on the 
victim that did not belong to her, but were “‘microscopically consistent’ with 
Dotson” and that could have come from “the same source,” implying they both 
came from Dotson.10 The analyst made no statements clarifying how likely such 
a match was, nor could he have, as there is no scientific definition or standard of 
what “consistent” means in hair microscopy.11 
The analyst also utilized a second technique known as ABO blood-typing, 
or serology, in an attempt to link Dotson to the crime.12 Unlike hair microscopy, 
serology is reliable and more definitive, allowing a technician or analyst to sci-
entifically surmise whether an individual is included as a possible source of a 
sample.13 This technique is used in attempts to identify individuals based on 
whether their blood or other bodily fluids contain one of the markers—A, B, 
both (type AB), or none (type O)—and thereby links them to particular samples 
found at crime scenes.14 In Dotson’s case, the sample taken at the scene was 
Type B, the same blood type as Dotson, and a type shared by only eleven percent 
of Caucasians.15 However, the analyst overlooked that the victim was also Type 
B, and thus the samples, containing a mix of fluids from the victim and a possi-
ble perpetrator, would be expected to contain some Type B substances.16 In ef-
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id. at 88. 
 8 Id. at 84–85. Forensic science, in theory, is the application of scientific knowledge and scientific 
methodology to help answer legal questions. See id. at 85. The term, however, encompasses a wide range 
of different fields, each with their own distinct standards and practices, some of which may not be truly 
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 15 Id. at 87. Gary Dotson was Caucasian. Id. at 84. He was just twenty-two years old when con-
victed. First DNA Exoneration: Gary Dotson, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVIC-
TIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongful
convictions/exonerations/il/gary-dotson.html [http://perma.cc/9XRM-5DJU]. 
 16 GARRETT, supra note 1, at 87. 
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fect, the fluids of the victim “masked” and overwhelmed that of the perpetrator, 
and the evidence was meaningless.17 Any man could have been the one who 
raped the victim, not solely eleven percent of the population carrying Type B 
markers.18 
Analysis of the young woman’s underwear presented another problem.19 
Many of the stains on the underwear were found to contain Type A material, 
whereas neither the victim nor Dotson had Type A blood.20 As such, the stains 
could not have originated from either of them.21 The analyst speculated that con-
tamination from another source, such as “dust, wood, leather, certain kinds of 
clothes, different cloth materials, [or] detergents in materials,” could have caused 
the detection of Type A substances.22 But this conclusion is illogical given that 
the purpose of serology is to either include or exclude individuals from a sam-
ple.23 If that kind of contamination were possible in serology, then it would be an 
“inherently unreliable” type of analysis to begin with, unable to accurately in-
clude or exclude individuals.24 
Dotson was convicted of rape in 1979 and sentenced to twenty-five to fifty 
years in prison.25 Had the circumstances been different, one might have praised 
the efficiency of the criminal justice system in so quickly finding a guilty man.26 
But there was one problem: no crime had been committed.27 The young woman 
confessed after Dotson’s conviction that she had fabricated the story, the injuries, 
and her accusation of Dotson in an attempt to hide her consensual intercourse 
with her boyfriend from her parents.28 There was no rape at all, but that made 
little difference to the continued incarceration of Gary Dotson.29 
Despite the subsequent recantation of the victim, the governor of Illinois re-
fused to pardon Dotson after a three-day clemency hearing recommended 
against it.30 In 1987, prominent defense lawyer Thomas M. Breen agreed to take 
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 18 See id. 
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 24 See id. at 88. Dotson’s defense attorney did not object to the inaccurate and false testimony, nor 
did he obtain his own counter expert. Id. The defense attorney did object to the use of the term “match” 
by the prosecutor in his closing statement when referencing the hair microscopy evidence. Id. The 
analyst had not used the term “match,” but rather said the hairs were “similar.” Id. This objection was 
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 26 See id. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. at 87. The accuser was concerned that she might be pregnant. Sharon Cobb, Comment, 
Gary Dotson as Victim: The Legal Response to Recanting Testimony, 35 EMORY L.J. 969, 969 (1986). 
 29 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 84, 88. 
 30 Id. at 88–89. 
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Dotson’s case and lobbied for the use of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, 
which in 1988 conclusively excluded Dotson as the source of the male genetic 
profile found at the crime scene, and instead matched the source to the victim’s 
boyfriend.31 Gary Dotson’s conviction was finally vacated by the Cook County 
Criminal Court in 1989 and he was released, becoming the first person to be ex-
onerated by DNA testing.32 
Dotson’s case was a turning point in how our criminal justice system is 
viewed.33 The rise of DNA testing introduced a revolution in the forensic scienc-
es, leading to more reliable forensic results for law enforcement.34 More im-
portantly, DNA testing made exoneration possible for numerous wrongfully 
convicted individuals.35 Many other fields of forensics have proven dubious in 
identifying perpetrators of crimes, and the conclusions of experts in these fields 
are often overstated, which can lead to wrongful convictions.36 Thus, DNA test-
ing provides hope of justice for many, but only if it is adequately available.37 
* * * 
On July 5, 1975 John Dolenc was out barhopping with his uncle in Bridge-
ville, Pennsylvania.38 He was supposed to meet his wife, from whom he had 
been estranged for a week, but she never showed up.39 His wife’s body was 
found three days later behind her apartment in Mt. Lebanon.40 Her clothes were 
shredded and removed, and her face was covered with a bloodstained slab of 
concrete.41 Dolenc was the police’s immediate suspect, despite his alibi.42 The 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Id. at 88; Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
 32 GARRETT, supra note 1, at 88–89; EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CON-
VICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 52 (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9TCA-R26V]; The Cases: Gary Dotson, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/cases-false-imprisonment/gary-dotson [http://perma.cc/3DKR-5JT9] [hereinafter Gary 
Dotson Case Profile]; Gary Dotson, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERA-
TIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3186 [https://
perma.cc/EF5V-7UG6]. 
 33 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 4. This includes practically every other field 
of forensic science, from hair microscopy, to serology, arson investigation, and ballistics analysis. See 
id. 
 37 See id. at 12. Many jurisdictions still deny access to testing to inmates who could potentially 
prove their innocence through DNA testing. Id. 
 38 Bill Moushey, DNA Evidence: Man Seeks DNA Test to Clear Him in Killing, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.post-gazette.com/frontpage/2005/12/19/DNA-Evidence-
Man-seeks-DNA-test-to-clear-him-in-killing/stories/200512190236 [http://perma.cc/U7DM-AWB6]. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
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investigation puttered away for six years, during which several other individuals 
were charged, yet ultimately their charges were dismissed.43 In 1981, however, 
Dolenc was finally charged and put on trial for the murder of his wife.44 
Because DNA testing did not exist at the time, the many bloodstains on the 
victim’s body and the cement block were tested only for blood type using serol-
ogy.45 All the blood tested was Type A—the same type as John Dolenc—but also 
the same type as the victim.46 Because John had a cut on his finger at the time, 
the prosecutor successfully argued that the blood could have been his, since a 
Band-Aid that may have been used to cover his finger was found at the scene.47 
It was on this forensic evidence alone, supplemented only slightly by evidence 
of the couple’s marital problems, on which Dolenc was convicted.48 
Pennsylvania passed a law allowing for post-conviction access to DNA 
testing in 2002 as an amendment to the Post-Conviction Recovery Act 
(“PCRA”), first passed in 1995.49 When John Dolenc filed for testing under this 
law, however, his request was denied by both the Superior Court and the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania on the basis of a requirement in the statute that the 
petitioner establish a prima facie case that the testing would prove the actual in-
nocence of the defendant.50 The Commonwealth argued that excluding the de-
fendant’s blood from the scene of the crime did not prove his innocence, thus 
DNA testing would be futile.51 John Dolenc died in prison in 2007, never gain-
ing access to the testing that could have proven his innocence.52 
Although DNA technology has provided a possible beacon of hope for 
those who have been wrongfully convicted, it is not a panacea.53 Without access 
to DNA testing, the errors of many past wrongful convictions can never be cor-
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. Although Dolenc was able to prove he was at several bars that night, the police did not 
check his alibi themselves, and at trial the prosecutor argued that Dolenc would have had time to kill 
his wife between stops at bars. Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. The police were not even sure of the specific day the victim was killed, which made it diffi-
cult to build a case against a suspect. Id. One individual, a former boyfriend who claimed to be con-
ducting an investigation of his own, was arrested, charged, and released all in one day, six months 
after the murder. Id. Eventually the police settled on charging Dolenc. Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1 (2014); Thomas G. Saylor, Post Conviction Relief in Pennsylva-
nia, 69 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 1, 1 (1998). 
 50 Moushey, supra note 38. 
 51 See id. 
 52 Jim McKinnon, Murderer Dies in Prison as DNA Appeal Continues, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.post-gazette.com/frontpage/2007/12/15/Murderer-dies-in-
prison-as-DNA-appeal-continues/stories/200712150139 [http://perma.cc/3GHZ-FE5U]. 
 53 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 101. DNA testing is just as susceptible to flawed interpretation 
as other forensic methodologies. See id. 
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rected.54 Moreover, although outdated, flawed technologies have been widely 
criticized in academia for their errors, unreliability, and lack of standardization, 
they are still broadly used today, thus continuing to compound mistakes.55As 
such, it is more important than ever that access to better, more reliable technolo-
gies such as DNA testing be made easily available to those who may be lan-
guishing under a false conviction.56 
This Note discusses the history of forensic science, wrongful convictions, 
and the Innocence Movement, and analyzes statutes in certain states that provide 
for post-conviction access to DNA testing on claims of innocence. Part I ex-
plores what forensic science and DNA testing are, how the flaws in forensic sci-
ence have led to wrongful convictions, and the subsequent development of the 
Innocence Movement. Part II examines Pennsylvania’s statute limiting post-
conviction access to DNA testing, thus improperly addressing the problems 
caused by faulty forensics and wrongful convictions. Part III argues that the 
Massachusetts General Law c. 278A should be used as a model for future post-
conviction forensic testing statutes because the legislation is notable for recog-
nizing two concepts critical to the fair administration of justice for wrongfully 
convicted individuals: (1) the repair of many of the problems endemic to older 
statutes, like that in Pennsylvania, and, (2) the forward-looking focus on the 
availability of DNA testing and on challenging the very foundations of forensic 
studies. 
I. FORENSIC SCIENCE AND ITS ROLE IN WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
Forensic science is a flawed tool that has led to thousands of wrongful con-
victions, and only in recent decades has access to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing begun to undo the damage.57 Forensic science has been used in the Unit-
ed States for decades to aid criminal convictions.58 Experts have claimed that it 
is able to identify “matches” accurately for evidence as diverse as fingerprints, 
handwriting, tire tracks, shoe tracks, tool marks, bite marks, bullet casing marks, 
hair, and even lip prints.59 But recent technological advances, notably DNA test-
ing, have led to the questioning of many other fields of forensic science and in 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. at 90, 114; infra notes 97–154 (discussing other popular methods of forensic science 
and their inherent flaws). 
 56 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
 57 See id. at 6–7. 
 58 Jane Campbell Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude?: The NAS Report on Forensic Science and 
the Role of the Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 299–300. 
 59 Id. 
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turn sparked the Innocence Movement, an organization aimed at exonerating 
wrongfully convicted individuals.60 
A. Forensic Science: Fundamentals and Origins 
Forensic science is routinely described as “the application of science to 
problems of law.”61 It is comprised of a wide variety of fields, each with their 
own distinct techniques and methodologies.62 The National Institute of Justice 
names twelve broad categories of forensic science each as their own individual 
category of study.63 Some of these, such as DNA testing and serology, have 
sound scientific bases.64 Others, such as latent fingerprints, firearms, tool marks, 
bite marks, hair microscopy, arson analysis, and pathology are based not on sci-
entific research, but on “experience-based” subjective judgments.65 They have 
been referred to as the “anecdotal” forensic sciences as well as the “nonscience” 
forensic sciences.66 
One primary type of anecdotal forensic science is identification.67 Identifi-
cation science includes “the comparison of fingerprints, handwriting, bite marks, 
voiceprints, tool marks, firearms, tire prints, shoe prints, and so on.”68 The goal 
of these fields of forensic science is individualization: the ability to place a par-
ticular object in a category unto itself, where one can theoretically conclude that 
a sample comes from a single source and excludes every other possible source in 
the world.69 For example, a forensic analyst might claim to be able to tell that a 
hair found at a crime scene is identical to one taken from a particular suspect, or 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 6. The Innocence Movement is an umbrella term that refers to 
the societal recognition that wrongful convictions are a critical problem and to the legal push to both 
exonerate individuals through DNA or other testing and expand legal reform to minimize wrongful 
convictions or maximize the ability of such individuals to seek redress, for instance through post-
conviction access to forensic or DNA testing and re-testing. See id.; infra notes 156–177. 
 61 Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way 
and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 152 (2008). Law Professor Brandon 
L. Garrett describes it similarly as “the use of science to help answer legal questions.” GARRETT, 
supra note 1, at 85. 
 62 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 38. 
 63 See id. The categories recognized by the National Institute of Justice are: general toxicology, 
firearms/tool marks, questioned documents, trace evidence, controlled substances, biological/serological 
screening (which includes DNA analysis), fire debris/arson analysis, impression evidence, blood pattern 
analysis, crime scene investigation, medicolegal death investigation, and digital evidence. Id. 
 64 GARRETT, supra note 1, at 94; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 40. 
 65 David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject Lessons from the His-
tory of Science, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 980 (2008). 
 66 Id.; Saks & Faigman, supra note 61, at 150. Law Professor David Faigman has compared these 
fields and their methodologies to phrenology, a discredited nineteenth century science that posited the 
possibility of predicting someone’s personality, mental illness, or other features from the shape of his or 
her skull. See Faigman, supra note 65, at 980–83. 
 67 Saks & Faigman, supra note 61, at 150. These are also broadly known as “criminalistics.” Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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that a shoe print could only have been left by a particular brand of shoes, or even 
a particular shoe.70 
There are also several forensic science fields beyond those concerned with 
identification, which similarly posit conclusions neither based on existing scien-
tific research nor rigorously tested by other experts before being presented in 
court.71 These include the fields of fire, arson, explosives, firearms residue, 
comparative bullet lead analysis, and aspects of forensic pathology.72 The com-
mon ground between the identification sciences and these fields is their reliance 
upon experience or anecdotes coupled with plausible, common-sense arguments 
to support their conclusions, rather than systematic, rational scientific inquiry.73 
For example, arson experts usually point to various known signs of fires set with 
an accelerant, such as a low burning fire or certain burn patterns, but subsequent 
scientific tests have found that these signs are not reliable indicators of acceler-
ant use, despite conventional wisdom.74 
Due to the weak or nonexistent scientific bases for most forensic sciences, 
the paths of science and forensics have diverged.75 Whereas science promotes 
constant questioning of prior assumptions, the main goal of the forensic sciences 
is to preserve the status quo: the criminal justice system affirms old methods as 
accurate to preserve authority.76 Forensic sciences were not sourced in an open 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See id. 
 71 Id. Rather than relying on evidence from scientific research or derived through testing, these 
fields rely primarily on knowledge passed down from previous generations of experts. See id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Saks & Faigman, supra note 61, at 150. 
 74 See Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science and the Execution of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 221, 225–26 (2013). 
 75 See Faigman, supra note 65, at 988. In the nineteenth century, the university system had yet to 
take hold in the United States. See Saks & Faigman, supra note 61, at 150, 152. Because of this, as 
much science was practiced outside the academic setting as inside it; wealthy amateurs, including 
Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, often were significant contributors to the general scientific 
knowledge. See Faigman, supra note 65, at 988. Over time, however, science was institutionalized, 
with universities teaching the scientific method and proper methods of scientific inquiry, as well as 
policing scientific standards. See id. The nonscience forensic sciences, however, did not join these 
academic institutions. See id. Instead, they became included as part of the police state and, therefore, 
the standards and practices they had were dictated by police needs rather than objective pursuit of 
knowledge. See id. 
 76 See Faigman, supra note 65, at 988–89. Forensic scientists themselves are, in fact, not general-
ly scientists at all as the word is typically meant, but rather are technicians. Id. at 987. They neither 
propose nor test theories, nor investigate the world around them to increase the general pool of 
knowledge, but rather apply a technique to a sample. Id. The majority have no graduate training in 
research, statistics, or any scientific field, even their own area of study. Id. Therefore, the lack of test-
ing of forensic hypotheses may be attributed to a lack of appropriately situated actors to test them, as 
the forensic scientists themselves do not have that capability. Id.A survey found that only one percent 
of forensic scientists had a doctoral degree or equivalent, and three percent had a master’s level de-
gree. Id. Therefore, even if forensic scientists had the inclination to test their hypotheses, they are not 
qualified to do so. See id. Forensic science also typically lacks appropriate funding for any such re-
search. Id. Moreover, the fields of forensics have been largely ignored by academics. Id. It is unlikely 
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scientific inquiry, but rather a closed process of inheritance over the past century, 
with succeeding generations adopting the practices of former generations with-
out testing them.77 
B. The Development and Power of DNA Technology 
The advent of DNA technology has had the paradoxical effect of both ex-
alting and undermining the position of the forensic sciences and their use in law 
enforcement.78 Prior to the discovery of DNA in the late 1980s, no other forensic 
technique could discriminate with great reliability between different possible 
perpetrators—at least not validly.79 The field of forensic science was altered 
dramatically in 1989 when Gary Dotson was exonerated by post-conviction 
DNA testing.80 For the first time, it was possible to not only determine who had 
committed a crime, but who had not.81 
The first method of DNA testing was developed in 1985 by a team of Brit-
ish scientists led by Alec Jeffries.82 This method, Restriction Fragment Length 
Polymorphism (RFLP) was useful because it produced a high degree of certainty 
of a positive match and thus could conclusively exclude someone as the source 
of a DNA sample.83 The use of RFLP became widespread during the 1990s, but 
was less useful in a criminal setting because it required a large sample of DNA 
and it was not suitable for use on the degraded samples typically found at crime 
scenes.84 Therefore, it is no longer a common methodology in forensic anal-
yses.85 
Gary Dotson was exonerated by a second type of DNA testing: polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) DNA testing.86 PCR is a technique that can amplify small 
                                                                                                                           
that this will change soon unless academics can be convinced that forensics bear some relevance to 
their own fields of study. See id. at 988. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 31, at 3. 
 79 See id.; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 7. 
 80 See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 31, at 4. 
 81 See id. at 3. Of course, in Dotson’s case, a perpetrator could not be determined because the 
claim of the attack was fabricated. See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 88. The scenario proved, however, 
that, had there been a victim, her perpetrator may have been identified through DNA. See id. 
 82 Michael P. Luongo, Case Note, Post-Conviction Due Process Right to Access DNA Evidence: 
Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009), 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 
130 (2010). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 31, at 4. A third method of DNA testing known as mitochondrial 
DNA typing (mtDNA) uses DNA drawn from mitochondria within a cell instead of the nucleus. Luongo, 
supra note 80, at 131. Mitochondria are intracellular bodies, or organelles, within human cells that pro-
vide cells with energy; they possess their own DNA separate from nuclear DNA. See Paluck ex rel. 
Paluck v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 104 Fed. Cl. 457, 471 n.18 (2012); Luongo, supra note 
82, at 131. The primary advantage of mtDNA typing is that it can be applied to biological samples that 
364 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:355 
quantities of DNA into testable amounts.87 PCR’s advantage over RFLP is that it 
only requires a short segment of DNA, and thus is effective on small or degraded 
DNA samples.88 When initially developed in 1985, PCR only examined a single 
locus, or area of DNA.89 As such, it could only produce a ninety-five percent 
likelihood that a sample came from a given suspect because some people have 
the same DNA in one particular gene, but it could conclusively exclude someone 
if he or she failed to match that locus, since a given individual’s DNA is always 
the same.90 The modern standard for PCR DNA testing, known as Short Tandem 
Repeat (“STR”), typically utilizes thirteen loci, or STR segments.91 This allows 
for an extremely discriminating test because it is very unlikely that two people 
would have identical DNA across thirteen different areas of the genome, and it is 
capable of producing matches in the statistical range of one in trillions.92 Any 
mismatches resulting from this test, therefore, are more likely than not due to 
human error.93 
Although initially developed as a method for determining paternity, DNA 
testing was quickly adopted by police and prosecutors for its potential to aid in 
criminal investigations.94 In 1987, DNA evidence was used to convict Tommy 
Lee Andrews of rape, the first such DNA-based conviction in the United 
States.95 Since then, courts have regularly admitted all forms of DNA evidence 
into trial as long as the DNA was properly collected and analyzed.96 
                                                                                                                           
do not contain nuclei, such as hair and bone, and thus cannot otherwise be tested by traditional methods. 
Luongo, supra note 82, at 131. As with primitive PCR, however, mtDNA currently only uses a single 
locus, and thus is too imprecise to match a specific person to a sample. Id. Despite this limitation, it can 
conclusively exclude a person and may sometimes be the only test available because of the DNA source, 
and thus has its use in law enforcement and post-conviction relief, including exonerations. See id. 
 87 Luongo, supra note 82, at 130. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. A gene is a unit of DNA comprised of 1000 to 100,000 base pairs that codes for a specific 
function. Id. at 129. Each gene resides at a specific position on a chromosome; that position is known 
as a locus. Id. Human DNA is organized into forty-six separate chromosomes contained within the 
nucleus of our cells. Id. 
 91 Id. at 130. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See id. at 131 n.40. 
 94 See id. DNA was first used in England in 1986 to confirm the confession of a seventeen-year-
old boy charged with a double rape-murder. Id. The test, however, cleared the teenager and later led to 
the identification and conviction of the real perpetrator. Id. 
 95 Id. Whether DNA testing was sufficiently reliable to be admitted in court was the major issue 
on appeal, and the court found that DNA “printing,” like serology, was scientifically reliable. See 
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
 96 See Luongo, supra note 82, at 132. 
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C. Flaws in Forensic Science Revealed 
For decades, forensic science has played a central role in producing evi-
dence used to convict those accused of crimes.97 As DNA testing has become 
increasingly dominant, the lack of firm scientific foundations for other forms 
of forensic science has become clearer.98 Faulty forensic science has played a 
prominent role in the initial convictions of most of the innocent individuals who 
have now been exonerated by DNA evidence.99 In fact, a persistent problem in 
the criminal justice system has been determining whether certain forensic sci-
ence is truly scientific at all.100 For instance, even if a scientific methodology is 
supported by empirical evidence, there is the further hurdle of ensuring that the 
testimony of experts at trial does not misrepresent what the science implies.101 
In 2009, the National Academy of Science released the report Strengthen-
ing Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (“NAS report”) in an 
attempt to evaluate these issues based on the findings of the congressionally au-
thorized Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Commu-
nity (the “Committee”).102 Its release ignited a mainstream policy discussion that 
had been stewing amongst academics: what to do about the problem of flawed 
forensics?103 The problems with forensic analysis extend beyond individual la-
boratory failures or errors.104 Rather, they reflect deep structural flaws in the 
criminal justice and forensics systems themselves.105 Flawed forensics result 
from a combination of shaky scientific bases, systematic underfunding, undue 
influence by police and prosecution on crime lab protocols, lack of access to and 
effective use of experts by defense counsel, and loose scrutiny of the admission 
of scientific evidence by courts.106 The Committee noted that, aside from DNA, 
                                                                                                                           
 97 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 4. For the past fifty years, science has moved to-
wards taking a central role in both the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Jennifer E. Laurin, Re-
mapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2013). 
 98 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 7–8. The authors note that forensic science 
protocols are not always based on valid scientific studies. See id. at 8. 
 99 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 89. 
 100 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 9 (noting that “[t]he law’s greatest dilemma 
in its heavy reliance on forensic evidence, however, concerns the question of whether—and to what 
extent—there is science in any given forensic science discipline”). 
 101 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 90. 
 102 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 1–2. The Committee was charged with the 
task of assessing the present and future needs of the forensic communities, making recommendations 
for maximizing the use of forensics to solve crimes, identifying scientific advances useful to law en-
forcement, making recommendations for programs to increase the number of qualified employees 
working in crime labs, and disseminating best practices for forensic technologies, as well as a general 
mandate to examine issues related to forensic science. See id. 
 103 See Laurin, supra note 97, at 1054. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 1052–53. 
 106 Id. at 1053. 
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no forensic methodology can reliably or consistently link a piece of evidence 
with a specific source or person, and that many of them lack a fundamental sci-
entific basis for the conclusions they draw.107 
Law professor Brandon L. Garrett categorizes two main types of faulty fo-
rensics: unreliable and invalid.108 Unreliable forensics are those that are not sup-
ported by rigorous science to validate their fundamental premises and methodol-
ogies.109 This category is roughly parallel to those referred to as “anecdotal” or 
“nonscience” forensic sciences by other authors.110 Examples of unreliable fo-
rensics include microscopic hair comparison, bite mark comparison, shoe print 
comparison, voice comparison, and fingerprint comparison.111 On the other 
hand, invalid forensics are those where the examiner—through negligence or 
actual fraud—misstates, overstates, or falsifies conclusions, no matter whether 
the underlying forensics are themselves reliable or not.112 
1. Unreliable Forensic Science 
Unreliable forensic science is predicated on the concept of a “match”—
meaning an expert evaluates a piece of evidence against a known sample and 
determines, based on a subjective, but detailed comparison, whether the two ob-
jects are deemed “similar” or “consistent.”113 The basic assumption underlying 
this field is that it is possible to claim, through subjective analysis, that a particu-
lar piece of trace evidence, for example a hair or a shoe print, was produced 
from a particular source, to the exclusion of all other potential sources.114 Precise 
individualization, however, is impossible.115 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 7–8. Although criticizing the lack of valida-
tion for practically every forensic field, lamenting the deficiencies in funding, training, and standardiza-
tion, and blaming courts for relying on forensic science without understanding its limitations, the NAS 
report nevertheless envisions that the future of criminal justice is inextricably linked to that of forensic 
science. See Laurin, supra note 97, at 1054. In making thirteen recommendations to reform the field, the 
NAS report did not reject forensics entirely, but instead attempted to reform its use in the court system. 
See id. 
 108 GARRETT, supra note 1, at 89. These categories are not mutually exclusive; forensics can be 
both unreliable and invalid, such as when a practitioner of hair microscopy misstates his or her con-
clusion or insists there is no error rate in his or her findings. See id. at 97. 
 109 See id. at 90. 
 110 See Faigman, supra note 65, at 980; Saks & Faigman, supra note 61, at 150. 
 111 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 90, 93–107; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
Simply because these fields have not been studied scientifically does not mean they cannot be; in 
particular, the NAS report is optimistic about improving the scientific reliability of many questionable 
fields, and includes many recommendations to that effect. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
8, at 8, 14–33. 
 112 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 89. 
 113 Id. at 90. 
 114 Saks & Faigman, supra note 65, at 154. 
 115 See id. To illustrate this, law professors Michael Saks and David Faigman reference a classic 
demonstration of the limitations of inductive reasoning, conclusions, or expertise based on experience or 
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The concept of individualization is unique to the forensic sciences.116 It is 
not a concept that has been tested or addressed by other, non-forensic scientific 
disciplines.117 It was developed using the components of the criminal justice sys-
tem to further criminal justice ends by discovering the identification of individu-
als who have committed crimes.118 Unfortunately, individualization has no theo-
retical or empirical basis and is a methodology no scientific field has ever tested, 
affirmed, or discovered.119 Even many forensic scientists concede that there is no 
scientific basis for believing precise individualization is possible, and that ana-
lysts are making a leap of faith when they testify to such in court.120 
The majority of identification sciences adhere to the concept that if an ob-
ject leaves a mark indistinguishable from a mark left on a crime scene, the two 
must be identical.121 Rather than attempt to measure the variability and the de-
gree to which various objects could have created an individual piece of evidence, 
the identification procedure assumes, without certainty, that if two marks match, 
they come from the same source.122 This method, however, does not have con-
sistent standards or bases of comparison to determine what, in fact, constitutes a 
match.123 Thus, individualization has fairly significant or nearly incalculable 
                                                                                                                           
observation through the “white swan” problem. See id. Inductive reasoning is the foundation of science. 
See id. If one attempted to prove that all swans are white, one might observe swans; after seeing one 
thousand white swans, one could be reasonably certain that this hypothesis is correct. See id. But there is 
always a chance of a non-white swan, and one cannot completely eliminate that chance merely through 
future observation. See id. If the thousand-and-first swan is black, one could change the hypothesis to 
only one out of a thousand swans is black, and could continue to test that new hypothesis through obser-
vation, but could never conclusively prove it; this is in essence what scientists do every day. See id. The 
flaw in the hypothesis of individualization is that, even after evidence of the failure to match a print, 
mark, or hair to a specific source, forensic scientists have failed to revise their hypotheses and instead 
continue to minimize or ignore contradictory evidence or explain away the false matches in order to 
continue claiming the possibility of a perfect match. See id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. This unproven and untested hypothesis was proposed in the nineteenth century by the Belgian 
astronomer Adolphe Quetelet, who theorized that “nature never repeats.” Id. at 155; Garabed Eknoyan, 
Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874)—The Average Man and Indices of Obesity, 23 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS 
TRANSPLANTATION 47, 47 (2008). Bertillion, a French police records clerk, then applied this hypothesis 
to prisoner classification and it was soon adopted by generations of forensic scientists. Saks & Faigman, 
supra note 61, at 155. 
 120 Saks & Faigman, supra note 61, at 154. 
 121 See id. The exceptions are DNA testing, which, arguably, is a forensic identification science 
although it is generally conducted in a scientific rather than anecdotal manner, and hair microscopy. 
See id. Hair microscopy usually intimates an ability to match a sample to a general population type 
rather than an individual, but, as with most other identification sciences, it fails to provide any statisti-
cal research to identify the prevalence of any particular type or feature of the hairs being compared. 
See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 95–96. 
 122 See Saks & Faigman, supra note 61, at 154. 
 123 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 95–107. 
368 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:355 
error rates.124 Exacerbating this issue is the problem that error rates for most 
fields of forensic sciences are unknown, and to the extent errors are detected, 
they are linked to the individual practitioners rather than the techniques them-
selves.125 Moreover, there has been significant reluctance on the part of forensic 
examiners to subject their techniques to error rate research.126 
Despite widespread criticism of these fields due to high error rates, general 
unreliability, ambiguous conclusory terms, and lack of scientific evidence, most 
of these methods are still used and represented as scientific evidence in criminal 
trials today.127 Courts have proven ineffective at screening out unscientific 
methodologies and techniques.128 This is primarily due to the fact that lawyers 
and judges, outside of those involved in patent prosecution and other specialized 
fields, tend to have very little training in science or statistics, and are thereby not 
the best adjudicators of scientific validity.129 Additionally, the standards for ad-
mitting expert evidence have historically been low, and have not fluctuated much 
despite more insistence for scientific rigor.130 The traditional forensic sciences 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See id. For example, in the case of hair microscopy, no scientist has actually documented what 
proportion of the population possesses individual microscopic characteristics. Id. at 96. Studies have 
found error rates for hair microscopy to be between twenty-eight percent and sixty-eight percent. See id. 
Additionally, forensic odontology, the study of bites and the prints left behind when things are bitten, is 
not based on objective criteria but rather on the faulty assumption that no two people leave the same 
bite marks. See id. at 102. Forensic odontology has a false positive error rate of almost sixty-four per-
cent, and a false negative rate of about twenty-two percent. See Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Foren-
sic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 394, 394 n.66 
(2004). Shoe print analysis also suffers because shoes are mass-produced commodities, and no re-
search has suggested that an individual’s gait has a unique effect on how the shoes are worn. See 
GARRETT, supra note 1, at 105. When attempting to conclusively prove that no two people leave the 
same fingerprints, researchers in fact conceded the opposite: that complete correspondence between 
prints was possible. See Saks & Faigman, supra note 65, at 155. Studies of handwriting analysis like-
wise showed many individuals with the same name signed their names indistinguishably from one anoth-
er, undermining the basic premise of the field. See id. 
 125 Cooley, supra note 124, at 397. 
 126 Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An “Intellectually Hon-
est” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 299, 342 (2007). Forensic scientists first began 
offering their evidence at the turn of the century as incontrovertible proof to aid in the conviction of 
crimes, in contrast to the tempered theories of academic science. See Cooley, supra note 124, at 393–94. 
Because forensic sciences developed to serve prosecutors’ offices, there was naturally a strong tendency 
to minimize the perception of error and fallibility. See id. at 394. The error rates that may be acceptable in 
academic sciences could prove disastrous for a prosecutor charged with proving something beyond a 
reasonable doubt to a jury. See id. If a sixty-four percent false positive error rate was admitted to a jury 
by a forensic odontologist, as mentioned above, that alone would likely create reasonable doubt if the bite 
mark analysis was a key part of a prosecutor’s case. See id. Simply claiming there is no error rate, or even 
that the error rate is not known, cannot be known, or has not been studied is more likely to produce a 
favorable result for the prosecutor, thus creating disincentive to study such rates. See id. 
 127 GARRETT, supra note 1, at 90. 
 128 See Saks & Faigman, supra note 61, at 161. 
 129 See id. Despite this, the judge is the final arbiter on whether someone is qualified as an expert. 
See id. at 162. 
 130 See id. at 161. 
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appear to have largely been grandfathered in as admissible despite lack of sup-
port for their reliability.131 The confluence of these factors makes it very difficult 
for courts to adequately adjudicate the reliability of forensic science.132 
2. Invalid Forensic Science 
Even if a forensic scientific method is reliable, it may still be invalid and 
possibly lead to a wrongful conviction if the expert testimony is inaccurate or 
problematic.133 Invalid testimony is defined as a general misstatement of conclu-
sions that make the forensic evidence of guilt seem stronger than it actually is.134 
Invalid testimony is a common problem across both reliable and unreliable fields 
of forensic science.135 Unsurprisingly, experts in unreliable fields may some-
times overstate their conclusions, but even in scientifically-grounded disciplines, 
such as serology and DNA analysis, forensic practitioners may also occasionally 
misrepresent their conclusions.136 Although technology improves over time and 
becomes more accurate, the humans conducting the analytical inquiry may still 
make mistakes.137 Invalid testimony is not necessarily the result of intentional or 
reckless acts, but possibly the result of a lack of experience, inadequate training, 
or poor oversight.138 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See id. There are not many people qualified to debunk forensics, as actual scientists do not 
study forensics, generally, whereas forensic technicians are not interested in debunking their own 
field. See id. Very few scientists know enough about forensics to evaluate them, and very few forensic 
technicians are interested in, or even capable of, self-evaluation. See id. 
 132 See id. 
 133 GARRETT, supra note 1, at 90. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. Overall, in sixty-one percent of the exoneree cases that Garrett examined in which a 
forensic expert testified for the prosecution, the conclusions of the expert were invalid. See id. Broken 
down, the error rates for specific fields ranged from fifty-eight percent for serology, to thirty-nine 
percent for hair comparison, seventy-one percent for bite mark comparison, seventeen percent for 
shoe print comparison, and five percent for fingerprint comparison. See id. Even experts testifying to 
DNA evidence came to invalid conclusions seventeen percent of the time. See id. 
 136 See id. Garrett’s study exposed the depth of these flaws in the cases of the first three hundred 
DNA exonerees. See id. In the case of Neil Miller, who was exonerated by DNA testing, a serologist 
had failed to account for the effects of masking in his analysis. Id. at 94. Masking occurs when a vic-
tim’s DNA overwhelms the perpetrators and thus prevents any meaningful result from being measured 
by testing. Id. As a result, he incorrectly stated that only forty-five percent of the general male popula-
tion could have been the rapist, including Miller, when in fact, because the victim and Miller shared a 
blood type, anyone could have been the perpetrator. See id. In the case of Marvin Mitchell, analysts 
made minor mathematical errors and erroneously divided statistics in half when stating the likelihood 
of a match. Id. at 95. As for DNA testing, during the trial of Gilbert Alejandro, one analyst, Fred Zain, 
who had not conducted the DNA test at all, claimed DNA could lead to “a hundred percent certainty,” 
rather than stating the actual likelihood of a match, whereas in the trial of Josiah Sutton, Zain falsely 
claimed only identical twins could be a match. Id. at 101. 
 137 See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 31, at 97. 
 138 See id. at 24. 
370 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:355 
As noted previously, very few forensic analysts are trained scientists or stat-
isticians.139 Generally, they do not have the training nor the time to perform the 
kind of error analysis required to ensure that their work is reliable and valid.140 
Most forensic analysts are overburdened simply when processing their typical 
workloads.141 And an undertrained or overworked analyst is more prone to mak-
ing mistakes.142 Because most crime labs do not employ more than a dozen or so 
analysts, however, each analyst usually has to testify in numerous cases.143 As 
such, one poorly trained analyst can potentially taint countless cases through 
poor testing and invalid testimony.144 
Although the majority of invalid testimony is likely the result of poor train-
ing or oversight, some is, unfortunately, of a more malicious variety.145 The sci-
entific community in general typically does not tolerate fraud.146 Nevertheless, 
scientific fraud has become a problem of increasing importance and visibility 
among academic scientists and the general media.147 Until recent decades, foren-
sic science has seemed mostly immune to such issues, due to skewed reporting 
focusing primarily on traditional science.148 Over the past twenty years, howev-
er, instances of forensic fraud have become more widely known and publi-
cized.149 For instance, in the early 1990s, Ralph Erdmann, a forensic pathologist 
from Texas, fabricated false autopsy reports, which contributed to at least twenty 
death penalty convictions; he himself was later convicted of falsifying autop-
sies.150 Pamela Fish, a forensic technician who worked for the Chicago Police, 
on the other hand, simply failed to report exculpatory findings, resulting in the 
overturning of seven convictions once the misconduct was detected.151 More 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Faigman, supra note 65, at 987. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id. An audit of a Houston lab found that it used “shoddy science” and “undertrained em-
ployees,” that it was “overwhelmed and underfunded,” and that it was unable to perform the needed 
forensic tests on every sample. See H. Patrick Furman, Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy of the 
Criminal Justice System, 32 COLO. LAW. 11, 23 (2003). Similar issues plague labs across the country, 
from Fort Worth, to Oklahoma City, to West Virginia, and even the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Crime Lab. See id. at 22–23. 
 142 See Garrett & Neufield, supra note 31, at 24. 
 143 See id.; JOSEPH L. PETERSON & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES 3, 6 (2002), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpffcl02.pdf [http://perma.cc/97L8-8CAC]. 
 144 See Garrett & Neufield, supra note 31, at 24. 
 145 See Cooley, supra note 124, at 399. 
 146 See id. 
 147 See id. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See id. 
 150 See id. at 401. 
 151 See id. at 402. Fish was ultimately moved to a new position that did not involve criminal 
casework rather than face any criminal charges. See Steve Mills, Crime Lab Analyst Moved, CHI. 
TRIB. (Aug. 16, 2001), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-010816roscetti-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/6G9Q-SJ9G]. 
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recently, Annie Dookhan, a former chemist at the Massachusetts State Police 
Crime Laboratory, was found to have falsified thousands of test results over the 
course of nearly a decade.152 She testified in more than one hundred and fifty 
cases before her transgressions were discovered, and was involved in more than 
thirty-four thousand cases at the laboratory from 2003 until 2012.153 As Massa-
chusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley, whose office prosecuted Dookhan, 
stated, “[c]ertainly one of the victims in this case, and the actions of Annie 
Dookhan, is the public trust.”154 
D. The Innocence Movement 
Although DNA technology is a major tool for the exoneration of innocents, 
it would have accomplished very little if not for the efforts of those who recog-
nized its promise and began pushing for change through the Innocence Move-
ment.155 The exoneration of Gary Dotson through DNA analysis sent tidal waves 
through the criminal justice system and spurred the societal development now 
referred to as the Innocence Movement.156 Dotson’s exoneration had not only 
uncovered the realities of wrongful convictions, but it illustrated how these con-
victions destroyed the lives of innocent individuals.157 Moreover, it spawned a 
host of ideas for potential reforms to improve the primary function of the crimi-
nal justice system: determining who is guilty and who is innocent.158 The Inno-
cence Movement refers broadly to the societal realization that innocent people 
are convicted of crimes, and that something must be done to rectify that, as well 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Sean K. Driscoll, “I Messed Up Bad”: Lessons on the Confrontation Clause from the Annie 
Dookhan Scandal, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 707, 708–09 (2014). 
 153 See id. Dookhan eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three to five years in state 
prison. See Milton J. Valencia & John R. Element, Annie Dookhan Pleads Guilty in Drug Lab Scan-
dal, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/11/22/annie-dookhan-
former-state-chemist-who-mishandled-drug-evidence-agrees-plead-
guilty/7UU3hfZUof4DFJGoNUfXGO/story.html [http://perma.cc/GN2S-2FLN]; Katharine Q. Seelye 
& Jess Bidgood, Prison for a State Chemist Who Faked Drug Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/prison-for-state-chemist-who-faked-drug-evidence.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/6C5C-TUV5]. 
 154 Valencia & Element, supra note 153. Beyond the lack of the public’s trust, the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts has had to deal with the fallout of defendants whose cases were affected by 
Dookhan’s participation. Id. As a Boston Globe article reported, as of November 2013, Massachusetts 
has spent $8.5 million reviewing the drug cases and holding special hearings for these defendants. Id. 
The Commonwealth has set aside $30 million to reinvestigate and prosecute affected cases. Seelye & 
Bidgood, supra note 153. Attorney General Coakley summarized the additional work that Dookhan’s 
transgressions created, stating, “The total costs to rectify Dookhan’s actions have climbed into the 
millions with no end in sight, and the financial aspect does not even address the loss of liberty of af-
fected individuals, the significant deleterious effect on the safety of the public or the breakdown of 
public trust in the system.” Id. 
 155 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 156 See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALA. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2011). 
 157 Id. at 1158. 
 158 See id. 
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as to those who work to further that mission by seeking criminal exonerations 
through DNA and other methodologies.159 In 1923, Judge Learned Hand stated 
non-ironically that: 
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our pro-
cedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man 
convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic 
formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats 
the prosecution of crime.160 
Much less famously, a Worcester County, Massachusetts prosecutor once pro-
claimed that “[i]nnocent men are never convicted. Don’t worry about it . . . . It is 
a physical impossibility.”161 Through the efforts of the Innocence Movement, the 
statements of the Worcester County prosecutor have been proven wrong.162 
Through the work of the Innocence Movement, 1577 individuals have been 
exonerated since Gary Dotson served as the first exoneration.163 Of these inno-
cent individuals, the use of DNA testing has contributed to 329 exonerations.164 
This exoneration rate based on DNA evidence—about twenty percent—seems 
low, yet DNA testing remains an influential part of the Innocence Movement165 
and has been cited by a National Academy of Sciences report as an instigating 
factor in its call for reform.166 
The Innocence Movement derived its initial momentum from the creation, 
through DNA exoneration, of a special class of cases in which there was little to 
no doubt as to the innocence of the exoneree.167 The Innocence Project, a promi-
nent pioneering institute of the Innocence Movement, founded in 1992 by Barry 
Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, contin-
ues to focus the vast majority of its efforts on post-conviction exonerations based 
on DNA testing.168 The Innocence Project stresses how DNA testing can provide 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See id. 
 160 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
 161 Findley, supra note 156, at 1165. 
 162 See id. at 1157 (quoting EDWIN M. BORCHARD & E. RUSSELL LUTZ, CONVICTING THE INNO-
CENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at vii (1970)). 
 163 The Cases: DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/cases-false-imprisonment [http://perma.cc/89EB-C8H7]) [hereinafter DNA Exoneree Case 
Profiles]. 
 164 Id. 
 165 About the Registry, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx [http://perma.cc/2DK4-CVE5]. 
 166 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 37. The National Academy of Sciences is-
sued this report at the behest of Congress to re-evaluate the current state of forensic sciences and rec-
ommend changes based on the revolution that was sparked by DNA and the Innocence Movement. 
See id. at 1, 4, 37. 
 167 Findley, supra note 156, at 1160. 
 168 Our Work, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent [http://
perma.cc/WZ9U-H7GG]. 
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irrefutable proof of the possibility of wrongful convictions.169 Many other Inno-
cence Projects at other law schools and law firms are similarly narrow in fo-
cus.170 
The Innocence Movement has butted up against pushback from those wed-
ded to traditional notions of the finality of justice.171 Some question whether 
wrongful convictions are truly systemic, or whether those exonerated are simply 
an anomaly.172 There is also significant resistance from numerous judges and 
prosecutors that are skeptical of the movement.173 Despite this skepticism, exon-
erations have continued apace; at the time of the publication of law professor 
Brandon L. Garrett’s 2011 book Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Pros-
ecutions Go Wrong, a comprehensive study of the existing DNA exonerations at 
the time, there were only 250 exonerations;174 as of April 2015, there have been 
329.175 
DNA exonerations are, as mentioned, not the whole story, and the Inno-
cence Movement has pursued other avenues as well in seeking exonerations.176 
Other forms of evidence can potentially exonerate a wrongfully convicted indi-
vidual.177 For instance, much of the traditional analysis and “rules of thumb” 
currently used by arson investigators lack a scientific basis.178 In the 1991 case 
of Cameron Todd Willingham, experts derided the methodologies used to con-
vict him as “junk science.”179 Five such experts criticized the indicators of arson 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See id. 
 170 See Furman, supra note 141, at 25; see also Innocence Program, BOS. COLL. LAW SCH., 
http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/center-experiential-learning/clinical-programs/innocence_program
clinic.html [https://perma.cc/K685-8V8D] (describing students’ work in the Boston College Law 
School Innocence Program clinic); Bluhm Legal Clinic: Center on Wrongful Convictions, NORTH-
WESTERN LAW, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/aboutus/ [http://
perma.cc/3NNW-DTDW] (outlining the National Center for Wrongful Convictions Program at 
Northwestern Law); Innocence and Justice Clinic, WAKE FOREST UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (2013), 
http://innocence-clinic.law.wfu.edu/about/ [http://perma.cc/F7TS-NKFF] (outlining Wake Forest 
University School of Law’s innocence clinic). 
 171 See Findley, supra note 156, at 1158. 
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identified by the fire marshal in his determination that arson caused the fire, not-
ing specifically that “each and every one of the indicators relied upon have since 
been scientifically proven to be invalid.”180 Despite the evidence arguably prov-
ing his innocence, and the efforts of attorneys working in the Innocence Move-
ment, Willingham was never exonerated during his lifetime and was executed.181 
Other arson cases, such as that of Victor Rosario in Lowell, Massachusetts, have 
been overturned due to their reliance on faulty arson evidence and subsequent re-
examination by modern experts with modern techniques and insights.182 
II. THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ACT: A FAILED SOLUTION 
As a result of the Innocence Movement, and to address concerns over the 
failure of forensic science to protect the innocent, as of 2015, all fifty states have 
passed post-conviction relief statutes providing access to deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) testing.183 Broadly speaking, these statutes allow convicted individuals to 
test biological evidence and, if the results are favorable, use that evidence to ap-
peal their convictions.184 The extent of access to post-conviction testing varies 
greatly depending on the particulars of the individual statutes that authorize it, 
and Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) demonstrates that not 
all solutions to the problem of faulty forensics are adequate.185 First passed in 
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1995, the PCRA is the only statute in Pennsylvania offering collateral review of 
a petition for post-conviction relief in state court.186 The PCRA provides access 
to all post-conviction relief avenues, including DNA testing, which was added 
through a provision passed in 2002.187 There are numerous cognizable issues one 
might debate regarding what a proper statute for access to post-conviction DNA 
testing might contain.188 Because there is so much variance from state to state 
regarding these statutes, no single state necessarily represents the best or worst 
model regarding a potential post-conviction DNA access statute.189 Despite this, 
some states, such as Pennsylvania, have clearly recognizable flaws in their post-
conviction DNA access statutes and could benefit from revising them to more 
closely conform to the exigencies of justice.190 
There are several major problems in the PCRA that prevent its just applica-
tion in regards to post-conviction access to DNA testing.191 One of the most se-
vere issues is that, to even gain access to testing, the convicted individual must 
be able to establish a prima facie case that the results of the testing will prove 
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actual innocence.192 Additionally, the statute includes an unfair procedural time 
constraint that blocks many meritorious cases from relief.193 Also, petitioners 
who previously pled guilty, confessed, or otherwise admitted to the crime they 
were convicted of are altogether precluded from accessing any sort of post-
conviction relief, including DNA testing.194 Finally, those who have served their 
time but are still required to register as sex offenders are prohibited from further 
challenging their convictions despite the continued limitations on their freedom 
that result from registration.195 
A. Requiring Proof of “Actual Innocence” 
By requiring the petitioner to prove a prima facie case that the results of the 
DNA test, if favorable, would establish actual innocence, Pennsylvania is erect-
ing a nearly impossible standard to meet for those seeking post-conviction test-
ing.196 This threshold requirement is the one that proved insurmountable to John 
Dolenc, as discussed in the Introduction of this Note.197 
In Pennsylvania, the courts have clarified that, if a test could potentially 
show that a convicted individual’s DNA was not found at the crime scene, either 
because no DNA was found at all or because another individual’s DNA was 
found instead, it is insufficient to establish actual innocence as required under the 
PCRA in order to be granted access to testing.198 In Dolenc’s case, his wife was 
found covered in a bloodstained slab of concrete.199 Because it would have been 
theoretically possible for him to commit the murder without bleeding himself, 
the prosecution successfully argued that even the absence of Dolenc’s DNA—or 
the presence of a third party’s DNA—would not have proven him innocent.200 
During trial, mere reasonable doubt is required for a defendant to be declared not 
guilty; in the context of post-conviction DNA testing, however, Pennsylvania 
                                                                                                                           
 192 Eleanor Grossman, Postconviction Proceedings, in 29 STANDARD PA. PRACTICE 2d § 138:130 
(2015). 
 193 See Brooks & Simpson, supra note 185, at 845. Pennsylvania requires inmates to file a collat-
eral relief petition within one year of conviction unless they discover new evidence. Saylor, supra 
note 49, at 3. In that instance, they have only sixty days to file a new petition from the date that the 
evidence was discovered. Id. 
 194 See Brooks & Simpson, supra note 185, at 861; PENNSYLVANIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, WHITE 
PAPER ON CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROPOSALS IN PENNSYLVANIA 7 (2014), http://innocenceprojectpa.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/White-Paper-on-Conviction-Integrity-Proposals-in-Pennsylvania.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/C56L-DDK7] [hereinafter CONVICTION INTEGRITY IN PENNSYLVANIA]. 
 195 See Brooks & Simpson, supra note 185, at 864 n.415; CONVICTION INTEGRITY IN PENNSYL-
VANIA, supra note 194, at 8. Consequences for sex offender registration are numerous and varied, 
ranging from public shaming, inability to work, find housing, or even being targeted by vigilantes. See 
infra notes 270–92. 
 196 See Access to Post Conviction DNA Testing, supra note 183. 
 197 Moushey, supra note 38. 
 198 Grossman, supra note 192, § 138:130. 
 199 See supra notes 37–51 and accompanying text. 
 200 See Moushey, supra note 37. 
2016] Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing: Massachusetts as a Model 377 
requires a petitioner to disprove every conceivable hypothetical before access to 
DNA testing is even permitted.201 
This standard certainly bars access to post-conviction DNA testing in cases 
where no clear third-party culprit is obvious because it is always possible that 
someone committed a crime but left no DNA, as posited by prosecutors in Do-
lenc’s case.202 But even in Dolenc’s case, where there was the possibility of a 
third party culprit, and other people had been charged with the crime prior to 
Dolenc, the court held that the fact that testing might find other individuals’ 
DNA at the crime scene was insufficient proof of actual innocence to allow for 
access to testing.203 It becomes difficult to craft a scenario in which DNA evi-
dence could more clearly point to actual innocence than in the situation of a third 
party culprit, yet the actual innocence standard of the PCRA demands something 
even more cogent.204 
This standard is notably more stringent than those found in most states.205 
Generally, all that other states require is for the defendant to prove that the evi-
dence produced through DNA testing will have a reasonable possibility of affect-
ing the verdict in the case.206 This is a substantially lower bar, allowing a de-
fendant to proceed on alternate theories of the case, rather than essentially re-
quiring the unraveling of the entirety of the prosecution’s case before even being 
provided access to testing.207 By setting the bar so high, Pennsylvania guarantees 
that many innocent individuals who have been wrongfully convicted will lan-
guish in prison, unable to access even the most basic tools to prove their inno-
cence.208 
Not only does Pennsylvania effectively deny access to justice through this 
standard, it also ensures that potential third party culprits will go free.209 In Do-
lenc’s case, there were numerous other potential culprits; had the DNA test im-
plicated one of them, the actual guilty individual could have been put behind 
bars.210 In fact, in forty-five percent of the first 250 exonerations conducted 
through DNA testing, the results identified a third party culprit, most often by a 
“cold hit” to a database; that is, these individuals were not implicated in the 
crime until the DNA testing was conducted.211 As such, it is vitally important to 
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allow for testing even in cases where there is not a clear, identifiable third-party 
culprit; more than a hundred murderers and rapists would still be free if access to 
DNA testing was denied as a result of restrictive standards such as those current-
ly in place in Pennsylvania under the PCRA.212 Cases like John Dolenc’s, and 
those of many other exonerees, make clear that the stakes are not only individu-
al, but impact society as a whole when innocents are forced behind bars and the 
guilty are allowed to remain free.213 
B. Unreasonable Statutory Time Constraints 
The PCRA has two major time constraints incorporated in it.214 First, all 
collateral appeals must occur within one year of the date of the judgment.215 This 
limitation even applies to subsequent petitions.216 This 365-day period is the on-
ly window available in which individuals may raise certain issues, including new 
evidence.217 The only exceptions for untimely petitions are if the petitioner can 
show that there was unconstitutional government interference, that new facts 
were discovered that could not have been ascertained with due diligence, or that 
there was a newly identified constitutional right that delayed the petition.218 
Thus, a petition filed after the 365-day window is unlikely to be granted access 
unless the petitioner can show not only new evidence, but that said new evidence 
could not have been discovered by him or her within the time limit.219 As such, 
if, for example, DNA evidence was discovered thirty years after a crime was 
committed, the PCRA might allow a new motion to be filed, but only if that evi-
dence could not have been discovered at the time of the crime—not merely if it 
had not been discovered.220 
Assuming satisfaction of these initial high barriers—namely, that a peti-
tioner has found newly discovered evidence and that evidence could not have 
been found earlier even with due diligence—there is one more temporal barrier 
the PCRA imposes upon potential exonerees.221 Petitions based in one of the 
aforementioned exceptions must be filed within sixty days of the first date the 
claim could have been presented.222 Thus, within sixty days of discovering the 
evidence requiring DNA testing, a potential exoneree must file his or her 
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claim.223 This requires the individual to either find counsel or gain the requisite 
skills needed to proceed pro se, which includes gathering all relevant evidence, 
and preparing and filing a petition for collateral relief.224 Failure to do either 
waives any further right to litigate the issue.225 Any petitions that fail to meet this 
stringent timeliness requirement are dismissed as untimely.226 
Taken together, these time constraints pose an almost insurmountable barri-
er for effective access to post-conviction DNA testing.227 The sixty-day deadline 
is one of the shortest in the nation and precludes many otherwise valid claims 
from being brought.228 Similarly, the one-year time limit for collateral relief is 
found within only one other state statute in the United States.229 The vast majori-
ty of states either expressly allow collateral relief at any time or implicitly allow 
access to relief by failing to specify a time limit.230 There is no justifiable reason, 
aside from an appeal to cost-saving, for such draconian restrictions in the 
PCRA.231 Innocent inmates already have an incentive to submit timely petitions 
because any delay means more time spent in prison.232 There are many reasons 
why an inmate may be unable to meet the stringent time requirement under the 
PCRA.233 The inmate may lack knowledge of the relevant law or the available 
evidence, and thus fail to muster a defense within the allotted timeframe.234 He 
or she may be unable to secure legal assistance, as the availability of post-
conviction defense for the indigent is limited, and innocence projects necessarily 
must limit those they grant their pro bono aid to.235 Securing such aid can also 
take many years, which would run out the meager one-year and/or sixty-day 
tolls.236 From the confines of a cell, most inmates can do little more than write 
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letters, most of which will go unanswered.237 Depriving them of any serious op-
portunity to challenge their convictions runs counter to the purpose of offering 
post-conviction relief.238 
Similarly, appeals to finality as justification for these time restrictions are 
unconvincing.239 When an innocent person is imprisoned, the justice system has 
not truly solved the crime because the real perpetrator is still at large.240 There is 
no value in allowing a criminal to continue wreaking havoc.241 Post-conviction 
relief statutes were created for the very reason that innocent individuals wrong-
fully convicted deserve justice, a need that trumps false finality.242 If these time 
restrictions are relaxed, concerns about numerous frivolous requests by guilty 
prisoners seeking access to DNA testing are unlikely to materialize because 
guilty prisoners typically do not seek confirmation of their guilt.243 Pennsylva-
nia’s time limits on access to post-conviction DNA testing are unreasonable and 
should be abolished.244 
C. Restrictions on Guilty Pleas, Confessions, and Admissions 
Initially, Pennsylvania’s post-conviction relief statute was thought to extend 
access to relief to those who pled guilty or confessed to the crime of which they 
were convicted.245 Subsequent case law, however, has drastically narrowed this 
proposition.246 In Williams v. Erie County District Attorney’s Office, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania ruled that inmates only have access to collateral relief if 
they prove that their guilty plea or confession was extracted involuntarily.247 The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court likewise ruled in Commonwealth v. Martinez that if 
someone had pled guilty, the only available justiciable issues on appeal are 
whether the plea was voluntary and whether the sentence was legal.248 As such, 
access to post-conviction DNA testing in a case in which the defendant pled 
guilty is extremely difficult, if not impossible, in Pennsylvania.249 
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Treating those who plead guilty differently from those who do not in post-
conviction relief must necessarily be predicated on one of two assumptions: ei-
ther innocent people do not plead guilty, or constitutional violations do not occur 
during plea-bargaining.250 Neither assumption, however, is accurate in these con-
texts.251 About ten percent of the first three hundred individuals exonerated by 
DNA testing chose to plead guilty in lieu of going to trial.252 
Innocent people may choose to plead guilty despite their innocence for 
many different reasons.253 It has become increasingly apparent that the rate of 
police-induced false confessions, often resulting in guilty pleas, is quite high.254 
Some researchers believe that the very nature of modern interrogation tech-
niques lead directly to false confessions.255 Interrogations can last long hours and 
involve constant leading questions and the undermining of a suspect’s story.256 
Individuals who falsely confess under interrogation pressure may have lost 
confidence in their own recollections or hope of the interrogation ever ending, 
and may agree to anything that will make the questioning cease.257 Some de-
fense attorneys even believe that it is beneficial for innocent defendants to plead 
guilty, and may improperly counsel their defendants to accept plea bargains that 
are particularly enticing despite their belief in the actual innocence of their cli-
ent.258 Studies have shown that individuals who maintain their innocence, but go 
to trial and are convicted, are given harsher penalties due to a perception of lack 
of remorse, thus further pressuring innocent individuals to plead guilty to crimes 
they did not commit in order to receive leniency.259 
Unfortunately, the exact rate of false confessions is unknown, but it is ap-
parent from exonerations that they are common.260 Marcellius Bradford served 
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six years in prison in Illinois for a murder he did not commit after he plead 
guilty in exchange for a twelve-year sentence and for providing testimony 
against his co-defendants; ultimately, DNA evidence exonerated not only him 
but his co-defendants as well, and implicated two other individuals.261 In a 
case involving the murder of a jogger in Central Park, five young men of color 
were wrongfully imprisoned for ten years on the basis of false confessions be-
fore the actual perpetrator confessed and was confirmed through DNA testing 
to have committed the crime.262 Innocent people plead guilty with regularity, 
and a system that ignores this concept and prevents these individuals from ac-
cessing post-conviction relief is inherently unjust.263 
D. Restrictions on Relief for Sex Offender Convictions 
Access to DNA testing under the PCRA is restricted only to individuals 
who are incarcerated at the time of petitioning.264 As a result, those who have 
been released from prison but are subject to sex offender registration or similar 
restrictions on their freedom as a result of their convictions are unable to avail 
themselves of the statute’s remedies.265 With the rise of sexually violent predator 
laws, notification laws, and registration requirements for sexual offenders, the 
freedoms of those convicted of such crimes are continually infringed upon long 
after their sentence has been served.266 Even lesser punishments, such as parole 
and probation, carry certain social stigmas that brand convicted individuals for 
the remainder of their lives.267 If these individuals are in fact innocent and are 
incorrectly forced to enter the sex offender registry, they cannot seek relief in 
Pennsylvania and have no choice but to live under the stigma of a sex offend-
er.268 
Samuel Scott and Douglas Echols were convicted of rape, robbery, and 
kidnapping in 1987 in Georgia based on faulty eyewitness identification, despite 
corroborated alibis.269 They maintained their innocence and, ultimately, DNA 
testing excluded them from the crime scene fifteen years later; prior to their ex-
oneration, however, they were paroled and forced to register as sex offenders.270 
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During their time on parole, the prosecution continued to defend their convic-
tions, and the men were forced to continue to register as sex offenders until their 
convictions were vacated due to DNA evidence that exonerated them.271 Scott 
had great difficulty finding employment during this time due to his registration 
status, and remembers it as “the most horrific thing I ever had to do in my 
life.”272 Had Scott or Echols been convicted in Pennsylvania, however, they nev-
er would have been granted access to DNA testing, could never have exonerated 
themselves, and would have been forced to register as sex offenders to this 
day.273 
Pennsylvania is one of at least nineteen states requiring those seeking post-
conviction access to DNA testing to be incarcerated at the time they seek re-
lief.274 This requirement effectively ignores the serious consequences of sex of-
fender registration on a no longer incarcerated, innocent individual’s free-
doms.275 Sex offenders are seen as the most repugnant types of offenders and are 
widely ostracized as a result.276 Public disclosure of the identities of sex offend-
ers can lead to vigilantism, public shame, or various forms of legal action, in-
cluding loss of employment and eviction.277 Many landlords refuse to rent to sex 
offenders and residency “buffer-zone” laws often further restrict their housing.278 
The extraordinarily harsh consequences of sex offender registrations are cogent 
arguments that these individuals deserve redress under the law and should have 
equal access to post-conviction testing even after release from prison.279 A crim-
inal justice system that continues to violate the freedoms of innocent individuals 
beyond incarceration and leaves them with no redress is inherently unjust and 
must be reformed.280 
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III. MASSACHUSETTS: A MODEL FOR OTHER STATES 
Massachusetts was unusually late in attempting to solve the problems of 
faulty forensics and wrongful convictions.281 Prior to 2012, Massachusetts did 
not have a statute devoted to post-conviction access to deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) testing.282 Unlike many states, which delayed in implementing such stat-
utes due to strong conservative cultures of law and order, Massachusetts experi-
enced such extreme delay in constructing a solution because the existing law and 
courts allowed for access to testing despite the lack of a specific statute granting 
access.283 Defense lawyers and courts carved alternative avenues for such ac-
cess, allowing nine DNA exonerations to occur between 1997 and 2007 despite 
no applicable statute granting access to testing.284 Thus, when change finally did 
occur in 2012, the environment was hospitable to creating a just, fair provision 
that allowed equitable access to DNA testing for those claiming actual inno-
cence.285 
A. Establishing a Fair Baseline: No Barriers to Entry in Standards,  
Time, or Offender Status 
Massachusetts, due in part to its tardiness in enacting a post-conviction 
DNA access statute and its close relationship with various Innocence Projects, 
should serve as a strong model for other states, such as Pennsylvania, that wish 
to patch the unjust gaps in their statutory laws.286 Massachusetts General Law 
278A, Post Conviction Access to Forensic and Scientific Analysis (“278A”), 
does not include the most common issues that are part of statutes like the Post 
Conviction Relief Act of Pennsylvania (PCRA), thus allowing for more just ad-
judication of innocent convicts’ cases.287 
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The standard a petitioner in Massachusetts is required to meet in order to 
gain access to DNA testing is considerably lower than that in Pennsylvania.288 
Rather than having to prove “actual innocence,” all a petitioner must show is that 
the results of a forensic test would be material to the identity of the perpetrator of 
the crime.289 The Massachusetts Supreme Court has further clarified that the 
standard of admittance for these motions is very permissive.290 The petitioner is 
not required to establish a prima facie case of innocence, nor establish that, if the 
results had been obtained at the time of trial, they would have impacted the ver-
dict.291 Rather, a petitioner must merely show that the evidence may be relevant 
to identify who committed the crime.292 This standard is similar to those in 
Maine and Michigan, which require that the results of the DNA testing be “mate-
rial.”293 It raises concerns, however, that this standard might be essentially the 
same as requiring a high likelihood of a favorable test result, essentially allowing 
the court to reject any testing request it deems unlikely to be favorable because 
of other evidence of guilt.294 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
however, has eliminated any such ambiguity in 278A: a petitioner must only 
show that the testing results would bear on the identity of the perpetrator, not 
that the result will be favorable to the defendant or that the results would have 
made any difference at trial.295 
Furthermore, unlike the PCRA in Pennsylvania, 278A has no time limits on 
when a motion for access to relief may be filed.296 This allows for free and just 
access to collateral relief no matter how long the innocent individual has re-
mained unjustly incarcerated.297 Allowing access to these avenues of relief at 
any time removes the onerous requirements of timeliness that have rendered 
Pennsylvania’s post-conviction relief almost impossible to exercise.298 Coupled 
with being free from having to establish a prima facie case for innocence prior to 
applying for testing, this allows a defendant to slowly build a case for innocence 
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through numerous testing orders, and ultimately, if he or she is indeed innocent, 
prove it through accurate scientific methods.299 
Also in contrast to the PCRA, 278A explicitly allows those who previously 
pled guilty to the crime they were convicted of to file 278A motions without re-
striction.300 As such, the statute recognizes the coercive pressures in the criminal 
justice system and the flaws in human nature that may cause an innocent person 
to plead guilty. Unlike the PCRA, 278A allows these individuals legal redress if 
they are, in fact, innocent.301 A whole class of wrongly convicted individuals 
who have been victimized and processed by the system, or coerced into pleading 
guilty or accepting a plea deal, are thus allowed a chance to fight back, albeit 
only once they have uncovered evidence that might clear their name.302 
Finally, unlike the PCRA, which is explicitly restricted to those who are in-
carcerated at the time they seek relief, 278A allows both those who are incarcer-
ated at the time they seek relief and those “on parole or probation or whose liber-
ty has been otherwise restrained as a result of a conviction” to pursue relief.303 
278A is open to any who have had their freedom constrained by the criminal 
justice system, be it through probation, parole, or sex offender registration 
laws.304 Under Pennsylvania law there is no redress for those so burdened. Thus, 
Pennsylvania should follow the Massachusetts model so that those who have 
been wrongfully convicted have a clear avenue for correcting the unjust re-
strictions on their personal freedom.305 
B. Further Advantages to the Massachusetts Model 
Massachusetts’s statute for post-conviction access to DNA testing contains 
several key features that make it an ideal model in contrast to the Pennsylvania 
statute.306 As discussed above, 278A has removed many of the barriers to post 
conviction relief that Pennsylvania imposes upon those wrongfully convicted.307 
Apart from avoiding the mistakes of the PCRA, 278A also has its own unique 
strengths that make it an ideal model for states like Pennsylvania that should 
revise their unjust post-conviction relief statutes.308 
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1. Preserving Evidence 
Many states include provisions in their post-conviction relief statutes relat-
ed to the proper handling of evidence that may potentially contain testable mate-
rial.309 Pennsylvania is one of the few states that does not require evidence to be 
preserved at all until a motion for testing has been filed.310 In essence, the state is 
not on notice that it may need to preserve evidence until an innocent individual 
files a motion, by which time the evidence may already have been destroyed.311 
Although this is a flawed and circular implementation, most states are little bet-
ter, with no real remedy if the state fails to live up to its obligation.312 Massachu-
setts, on the other hand, now requires all biological evidence to be preserved 
during the entire period of incarceration.313 Moreover, Massachusetts adds a pu-
nitive element to 278A, sanctioning government officials who act in a reckless 
manner that results in the destruction of evidence with charges of contempt.314 
Thus, in Massachusetts, the requirement of preserving evidence is effectively 
enforced against potential reckless actors.315 
By establishing criminal sanctions for those who recklessly destroy evi-
dence, Massachusetts ensures that there will be clear accountability for those 
responsible for safeguarding evidence that may potentially exonerate innocent 
people.316 This could be improved in the future, perhaps, by instituting a lesser 
degree of punishment for those who destroy evidence through negligence, there-
by allowing some justice for those harmed in the destruction of evidence when a 
crime lab was not criminally reckless, but nevertheless did not live up to the 
standard of care expected of forensic analysts.317 Luckily, Massachusetts has 
also established a 278A working group that collaborates between law enforce-
ment and the Innocence Movement to help promulgate proper standards for evi-
dence preservation, which will help to ensure proper preservation of evidence, 
provide a clearer way to distinguish reckless conduct versus negligent conduct, 
and represent a powerful step toward the affirmation of the power of the Inno-
cence Movement.318 
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2. The Massachusetts Model as an All-Purpose Forensic Testing Statute 
The Massachusetts solution is an important model for additional reasons as 
well.319 Unlike the PCRA and many other state laws, whose statutes governing 
access to post-conviction DNA testing is limited to DNA testing rather than other 
forensic methodologies, 278A is phrased in broad terminology.320 The chapter 
under which the DNA testing provisions are found is titled “Post Conviction Ac-
cess to Forensic and Scientific Analysis.”321 Within this chapter, the statute states 
that “[a] person may file a motion for forensic or scientific analysis under this 
chapter,” which expands the possibilities of testing other types of forensic evi-
dence beyond just DNA.322 The statute also helpfully defines the term “analysis” 
to mean “the process by which a forensic or scientific technique is applied to 
evidence or biological material to identify the perpetrator of a crime.”323 Because 
of this intentional generality, 278A is not merely a statute for access to post-
conviction DNA testing.324 Rather, it is an open allowance for the wrongfully 
convicted to challenge any and all previous forensic and scientific analyses that 
may have been conducted incorrectly in the past due to lack of knowledge or 
scientific rigor, so long as said analysis is relevant to the identity of the perpetra-
tor.325 Thus, whereas statutes like the PCRA are limited to remedying only those 
cases in which flaws were caused by a lack of access to DNA testing or undis-
covered evidence that can now utilize DNA testing, 278A allows for reevalua-
tion in a broad range of cases where prior, otherwise incorrect analysis may now 
be re-tested using modern, more accurate techniques.326 
C. Areas for Further Improvement: The Appointment of Counsel 
In addition to provisions governing access to testing, 278A allows for the 
discretionary appointment of counsel if a petitioner is indigent.327 For contextual 
reference, many states allow discretionary appointment, some states require ap-
pointment, and others explicitly disavow the right to counsel at the post-
conviction stage.328 But discretionary appointment of counsel is problematic for 
several reasons.329 The difficulty of litigating a post-conviction forensic testing 
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request varies from state to state; Massachusetts, with its relatively permissive 
standards, would likely be considered one of the easier states in which to do 
so.330 Nevertheless, it is universally difficult to pursue these motions without 
counsel.331 In order to succeed on a 278A motion, an inmate must be able to in-
vestigate the evidence, draft the testing motion, submit affidavits, litigate the 
testing motion, negotiate and oversee the lab testing, interpret and apply the test 
results, and then draft and litigate any resulting motions, petitions, or appeals 
that would be required based on the results.332 Absent counsel, all of this must be 
accomplished from a jail cell, unless the prospective exoneree is on probation or 
otherwise released.333 
It may not be feasible to appoint counsel to assist with every single motion 
for forensic testing, especially under a statute such as 278A in which the stand-
ard for allowing motions is fairly forgiving and more applications are likely to be 
filed.334 The current statute, however, leaves appointment entirely discretionary 
to the judge, which potentially allows meritorious claims to fail on procedural 
grounds if an innocent inmate is unable to draft the motions his or herself or 
convince a judge that his or her case deserves special attention not afforded to 
others.335 It would be beneficial to establish a standard dictating when counsel 
should be appointed; although fears of frivolous applications are likely unfound-
ed, any such problems would only be exacerbated by attaching a lawyer to each 
and every claim made for testing.336 A finding that the evidence to be tested is 
not only material to the identity of the perpetrator, but has a reasonable likeli-
hood of returning a favorable result for the petitioner, could serve as a reasonable 
standard by which a petitioner may be appointed counsel for the purposes of 
drafting a 278A motion.337 Importantly, petitioners who could not meet this 
standard could still proceed pro se; this standard might prove beneficial in allow-
ing assistance for the most meritorious of cases and thus streamline the first step 
on the road to exoneration.338 It should not be viewed as further limiting the abil-
ity of a litigant to pursue testing, but merely to clarify when a litigant must be 
afforded counsel to aid him or her.339 
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CONCLUSION 
Forensic science is currently undergoing a difficult transitional process. It is 
now known that many of the old techniques for evaluating evidence are lacking 
scientific basis or justification. Consequently, new techniques are quickly eclips-
ing old methods in utility. Like a phoenix, forensic science must be destroyed so 
it can be reborn anew in a more socially functional form. 
Post-conviction access to DNA testing plays a vital role in both the tearing 
down of the old, inaccurate, and invalid regime of identification-centric forensic 
procedures and in exonerating the wrongfully convicted. As such, the more ac-
cessible post-conviction procedures are, the faster the wrongs of the past will be 
made right and the sooner those techniques which are proven unscientific by the 
superior DNA technology will be properly abandoned. Although the PCRA was 
enacted in hopes of granting access to reparative DNA testing, that promise has 
failed due to the statute’s overly restrictive requirements and onerous standards. 
In contrast, the Massachusetts version of these statutes, 278A, should serve as a 
model to others because, not only does it make it easier for the convicted to ac-
cess and make use of testing, but it is uniquely forward thinking in its implemen-
tation, allowing access to any sort of testing which might allow for the identifi-
cation of the perpetrator. Thus, it is an especially powerful tool for challenging 
outdated procedures that have been replaced by new ones, further burning the 
old bird of forensic analyses to fuel the rebirth of better, stronger, and more accu-
rate forensic techniques of the future. DNA technology has already established 
that the advent of new scientific methods can revolutionize how we perceive 
justice. By allowing for any and all convictions to be tested by the rigors of ad-
vancing science, 278A has embraced the future and the scientific method as it 
applies to criminal justice. 
